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Consider the class of protocols, for two participants, in which the initiator 
applies a sequence of operators to a message M and sends it to the other 
participant; in each step, one of the participants applies a sequence of operators to 
the message received last, and sends it back. This "ping-pong" action continues 
several times, using sequences of operators as specified by the protocol. The set of 
operators may include public-key encryptions and decryptions. An O(n 3) algorithm 
which determines the security of a given protocol (of length n) is presented. This is 
an improvement of the algorithm of Dolev and Yao (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 
IT-30 (2) (1983), 198-208). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of public-key encryption, (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Rivest et aI., 
1978) for secure network communication has received considerable attention. 
Such systems are effective against a "passive" eavesdropper, namely, one 
who merely taps the communication line and tries to decipher the intercepted 
message. However, as pointed out by Needham and Schroeder (1978), an 
improperly designed protocol can be vulnerable to "active" sabotage. 
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The saboteur may be a legitimate user in the network. He can intercept 
and alter messages, impersonate other users or initiate instances of the 
protocol between himself and other users, in order to use their responses. It
is possible that through such complex manipulations he can read messages, 
which are supposed to be protected, without cracking the cryptographic 
systems in use. 
In view of this danger it is desirable to have a formal model for discussing 
security issues in a precise manner, and to investigate the existence of 
efficient algorithms for checking the security of protocols. 
Dolev and Yao (1983) investigated the security of what we call here 
"ping-pong protocols." These protocols involve two participants, the sender 
S and the receiver R. Let M be a message generated by S. First, S applies a 
sequence of operators to M and sends it to R. Next, R applies a sequence of 
operators to the message received, and sends the result back to R. In each 
step, the participant applies a sequence of operators to the last message 
received, and sends it back. The number of times this is done, as well as the 
sequences of operators used, is defined by the protocol. 
Dolev and Yao considered the security of two such families of protocols, 
assuming only few limitations on the behavior of the saboteur. Their second 
and more general family of protocols is extended here to allow more 
operators, and an O(n s) time algorithm for checking the security of protocols 
is presented. This improves the algorithm of Dolev and Yao, which is O(n 8) 
time. 
We briefly recall the essence of public-key systems (see Diffie and 
Hellman, 1976 or Rivest et aI., 1978 for more details). Every user X has an 
encryption function E x and a decryption function D x. Both are mappings 
from {0, 1}* into {0, 1}*. There is a public directory containing all (X, Ex) 
pairs, while the decryption function D x is known only to X. The main 
requirements on E x, D x are: 
(1) ExDx=DxEx=2,  where 2 is the identity function, and 
(2) knowledge of Ex(M ) does not reveal anything about the value M. 
Before we attempt any formal definitions of protocols or security let us 
consider several simple examples of protocols, and discuss informally their 
security. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following protocol: 
(1 )  (X,E~,(M), Y), 
(2) (Y, Ex(M ), X), 
which simply means this: X wants to send M to Y and get an echo in order 
to verify that M has reached Y. He computes Ev(M ), using Y's public 
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encryption key and sends via the network (X, Er(M ), Y), which stands for 
"X sends to Y the message Er(M)." Clearly, no one but Y can apply D r to 
Er(M ), in order to recover M. After doing so, Y computes Ex(M ) and sends 
(Y, Ex(M ), X). When X gets it he can compare the echo, DxEx(M ), with the 
original M in order to verify that M has indeed reached Y. 
This innocent-looking protocol is insecure. A saboteur Z may intercept 
(X, Er (M ), Y) and replace it by (Z, Er (M ), IT). Y will get M, and respond, 
according to the protocol by sending (Y, Ez(M ), Z). Z can now read M by 
applying his secret key, D z. He can then even produce the echo 
(Y, Ex(M ), X) and send it over to the satisfied and unsuspecting X. Clearly, 
this works only if M does not include information about the original sender's 
identity. Indeed, this observation leads to the technique of name-appending: 
EXAMPLE 2. (1) (X, Er(MX),Y ), 
(2) (Y, Ex(M ), X). 
The word MX is formed by appending to M the name X. Now, after Y 
applies D r to Er(MX ) to get MX, he checks whether the suffix of the string 
matches the declared name of the sender, i.e., X. If it does not, he knows that 
someone has meddled with the message and simply terminates his 
participation in this instance of the protocol. Otherwise, he computes Ex(M ) 
and sends (Y, Ex(M ), X). 
This protocol is indeed secure. A formal way to prove it will be shown in 
Section 3. 
One may be led to believe that name-appending is the cure for all evils, 
but consider this seemingly "even safer" protocol: 
EXAMPLE 3. (1) (X, EdEdM) X), Y), 
(2) (Y, Ex(M ), X). 
Here the name X is appended to Er(M ) instead of to M itself. This protocol 
is insecure! 
One can use the algorithm of Section 3 to verify that this protocol is 
insecure. There are two natural ways to crack this protocol. One method is 
as follows: Z sends (Z, Er(Er(Er(M)X)), Y), receives (Y, Ez(Er(M ) X), Z), 
sends (Z, Er(Er(M) Z ), Y) and receives (Y,E~(M), Z). Another method: Z 
sends (Z, Ex(Ex(M ) Z), X) and receives (X, Ez(M ), Z). 
In addition to the operator E x and D x, we have used in the last two 
examples two more operators, which we shall denote ix and d x. If X is a 
string (name of user X) and M is a string (message) then ix(M ) = MX. Let S 
be a string, dx(S ) is defined as follows. If X is a suffix of S, i.e., S = MX, 
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then dx(S ) = M; else, dx(S ) is undefined, which means that the participation 
in this instance of the protocol is terminated. Clearly, 
d,, i , ,  = a 
but ixdx(S ) is not even defined (unless S = MX for some M). 
Let us also define an operator d, which is simply the removal of the 
appended user name. This is easy to do, if, for example, all names use 
exactly the same number of bits. Therefore, it is natural to assume that a 
saboteur can perform d. Thus, for every user name X, 
d ix=2 
but again ixd(S ) = S only if S = MX. 
In general we shall assume that there is a set of operators 22 which can be 
used by the participants in the network. Some operators may have a user 
name subscript (such as E x, Dx, ix, and d x in our examples). The subset of 
operators, which user X can perform will be denoted by Sx and will be 
called X's vocabulary. The vocabularies of all users are similar in the sense 
that if one replaces the index X by II, and Y by X, in 22x, the result is Zy. 
Also, there will be a given set of cancellation rules of the form ar = 2, 
where a and r are elements of 22. If both a and r are indexed then the indices 
are the same. The cancellation rules are similar for all users. Thus, if one or 
both operators are indexed then the same cancellation rule holds for every 
user name index. 
In our examples, 
Z = {d} U {E x, D x, i x, dx lX is  a user name}, 
Z x = {d, Dx} kJ {Er, iv, dvl Yis a user name}, 
and the cancellation rules are 
and 
ExD x = )~, 
DxE  x = )t, 
dx ix=2,  
d i .  = ,~. 
Note that if a, b, c E Z, ab = 2 and bc = 2 then a = e. This follows from 
the fact that members of 22 are operators: Let w~{0,1}* ,  abc(w)= 
a(bc(w))=a(w) ,  since bc=A,  but on the other hand, abc(w)= 
ab(c(w)) = c(w). Thus a = c. 
Given a string a E 22*, one may repeatedly apply cancellation rules until 
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no cancellation rule is applicable any more. By the previous paragraph, the 
reduction process has the Church-Rosser property (Rosen, 1973), and thus 
the end result is unique. Let us denote this reduced form of a by c7. 
An underlying assumption i  our analysis is that the set 22 is free from any 
relations other than those implied by the cancellation rules. That is, two 
strings of operators, a and fl are equivalent if and only if both have the same 
reduced form. 
1I. PING-PONG PROTOCOLS AND SECURITY 
DEFINITION. A ping-pong protocol P(S,R) is a sequence 
F= (a~, a2,...,at) of operator-words, uch that if i is odd then a i C 22* and if 
it is even then a i ~ 22*. 
The structure of the protocol is similar for every ordered pair of (different) 
users. Thus, if in P(V, W), we replace the index V by X, and W by Y, we get 
P(X, Y). We assume that for every two users X and Y, P(X, Y) may be 
initiated, i.e., there are no restrictions, imposed by the network or the users, 
on communication via P. 
In Example 1, a1[S,R ] =ER, a2[S,R ] =EsD R and l=  2. In Example 2, 
al[S,R]=ERi s, c~2[S,R]=EsdsD R and again /=2.  In both examples, 
a~(M) is sent by S to R and azal(M ) is sent by R, back to S. 
In general the interpretation is as follows: S invents a message-word 
MC {0, 1}*. He applies a 1 to it and sends it to R; i.e., the first step is 
(S, al(M),R ). Next (R, a2a~(M),S ), etc. If I is odd the last step is 
(S, al~l_ 1 ... al(M), R) and i f / i s  even, then it is (R, atal_ l ... al(M), S). 
In this paper, we are not concerned with the purpose of using P. Instead, 
we are interested only in the question of whether a saboteur (or a group of 
them) can extract M. 
Thus, we assume that some user S has invented a message M, chosen a 
user R and initiated P(S,R) on.M. We assume that neither S, nor R, is a 
saboteur. We have to define what are the actions which the saboteur(s) can 
take. 
We shall assume that for every 1 ~ i ~< l, for every two different users X 
and Y and for every WE {0, 1}* the saboteur can effect ai[X, Y] on W. We 
shall explain, shortly, why we make this assumption, but if one believes that 
this is too conservative one may restrict he saboteur actions, and as long as 
these restrictions are symmetric (not username dependent), an O(n 3) 
algorithm for checking security still exists. For example, one could assume 
that a saboteur cannot effect al[S, R] if he is not S, or that he cannot effect 
ai[S,R], 1 <,i<~l, if he is not S. 
Let us denote the saboteur by Z. If X= Z, then Z has no difficulty to get 
al(W ), since a1~27".  If X¢:Z  (and X is not one of the collaborating 
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saboteurs) Z may be able to convince X to initiate P(X, Y) on W. By tapping 
the message (X, a l (W ), Y), Z will get at(W). 
In order to effect a~[X, Y] on W, for 1 < i <~ l, Z can wait for P(X, Y) to 
occur (or somehow convince X to initiate it), wait for the ( i -  1)th message, 
(X, a i_ la i_  2 ... at(M), Y)--assuming i is even, intercept it and replace it 
with (X, W, Y). Now, Y responds with (Y, a i (W),X) ,  as expected of him 
(assuming a i (W ) is defined) and sends it through the network, where Z can 
tap it. It follows that the language of operator-words which a single saboteur 
Z can effect (on any WE {0, 1}*) is 
A = [S z U {a~[X, Y] I 1 ~ i ~ l, X and Y are different users }] *. 
DEFINITION. Let a l [S ,R  ] be the first operator-word of P(S ,R)  and 
Z ~ {S,R}. P is insecure if there exists an operator-word 7 ~ A such that 
ya 1 = 2. 
Observe that it is not necessary to consider ctioti_ I ... al(M), for 1 < i~< l, 
which is also heard over the network. For if a Y ~ zl exists which satisfies 
ya~ai_ ~ ... a I =2 then there is a Y' CA (in fact y' =ya ia i_  ~ ... a 2 will do) 
for which y'a 1 = )~. 
In the definition of security given above, we called P insecure if for some 
ordered pair of users (not including saboteurs), a ? EA exists for which 
ya~ = 2. In fact, such a 7 exists for one pair (S, R) if and only if it exists for 
every set of users. This follows immediately from the fact that change of 
names of users does not change the pattern of cancellations. Thus, in what 
follows we shall restrict our attention to a fixed pair of users, (S, R), free of 
saboteurs, and only consider the question of whether for aI [S ,R]  a yEA 
exists which satisfies ya! =2.  
One may wonder why we have defined A to include Z z, but have not 
allowed a set of saboteurs {Z~,Z2,.. . ,Zm} and put (,.)m~a,Y, Zi in A instead. 
Let us show that this is not necessary, since whatever a set of saboteurs can 
do, a single saboteur can do also. 
Assume 7= t~1/~152/~ 2 " '"  /~k6~X+ 1, where for every 1 ~<j~ k + 1, 
~ E Xzp 
: [ 
and for every 1 ~ j~ k,/~j is some ai[X, YI, Where X=~ Y and 
7. al[S,R] =4. 
We may assume that ifflj = a~[X, Y] then the performer of a i (X for odd i, Y 
for even i) is not a saboteur, for otherwise a i ~ [(~ SZp ] * and there is no 
need to single out fl:, which can be absorbed in ~j, 
If we now replace saboteur Zp by Z, for all p, in y, the cancellation will 
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still occur, and all eti's used (for flj.'s) will still be legitimate, since its two 
users will be different. Thus, if a y exists for a set of saboteurs, it exists for 
one. 
Our next goal is to restrict A even further, in order to simplify the security 
decision problem. Let us show that if a yEA exists, for which 
~. a 1[S, R] = ~, then the same statement holds for 
A' = {27zU {ai[X, Y]J 1 <~ i<~ l ,X~ Yand {X, Y} cR ,  S,Z}}*. 
If we replace each user U (~ {R, S} who appears in y by Z, the cancellation 
pattern is maintained while each ai either remains legitimate (with two 
different users X, Y, {X, Y} c {R, S, Z}) or becomes an operator-word in 
22*. This proves that we can replace A by A' in the security decision 
problem. 
III. AN ALGORITHM FOR CHECKING PROTOCOL SECURITY 
Construct a nondeterministic finite state automaton A, as follows: 
(1) State 0 is the (unique) initial state and state 1 is the (unique) 
accepting state. The (input) alphabet is 27 = 27z U 27s U N R . 
(2) There is a directed path from state 0 to state 1 whose (input) 
labels correspond to a 1[S, R ]. 
(3) For every input letter (operator) ~ E 22z, there is a self-loop from 
0 to 0, labelled ~. 
(4) For every aAX, Y], l~<iE l  and {2(, Y} c {R, S, Z} there is a 
loop from 0 to 0 whose edges are labelled, in sequence, by the letters of a i. 
Consider the protocol of Example 2. We have seen that a 1 IX, Y] = Evi x 
and a2[X, Y] = ExdxD r. Thus, the automaton A is as shown in Fig. I. The 
self-loop labeled a E £'z represents 11 self-loops, i.e., one for each member of 
Z'z, where 
27z = {ER, Es, Ez, Dz, iR, is, iz, dR, ds, dz, d}. 
The security question, therefore, translates into the following: Is there no 
accepting path, in A, whose corresponding input word w satisfies ~ = 27 The 
protocol is secure if and only if no such collapsing word is accepted by A. 
In our example, the loops whose intermediate states are 1 1 to 20, are all 
superfluous, since they correspond to words in 2;*. Thus, A can be 
simplified, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Let us assume that the (simplified) automaton A has been constructed and 
that its set of states is S =- {0, 1,..., s}. We say that a directed path, p, in A 
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collapses, if its corresponding word w collapses, i.e., # = 2. Define the 
collapsing relation C <_ S X S as follows: (i,j) ~ C if there is a directed path 
from i to j, in A, which collapses. The security question is therefore reduced 
to the question of whether (0, i) C C. The protocol P is secure if and only if 
(0, 1 )~C.  
In what followg, i~o j  stands for an edge from state i to state j, labelled a. 
Q is a queue of pairs of states. Our algorithm for constructing C is as 
follows: 
(0) C*--{(i,i) lO~i~s  }, Q*--C. 
enters Q once] 
while Q 4=- ~, do 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
and 
]Comment: Each new pair of C 
Delete the first pair, (i,j), from Q. 
I f  (j, k) ~ C and (i, k) ~ C then put (i, k) in C and in Q. 
I f  (k, i) C C and (k,j) q~ C then put (k,j) in C in Q. 
(4) I f  k -~ i  and j -~Tl and or=) .  [is one of the cancellation rules] 
(k, l) ~ C then put (k, l) in C and in Q. od 
The algorithm terminates, since there can be at most (s + l)Z pairs in C 
and each can cause the loop to occur one; the number of operations in each 
pass of steps (1)-(4) is easily seen to be finite. We shall shortly examine the 
time complexity questions more closely. 
THEOREM 1. The algorithm generates the collapsing relation C of 
automaton A. 
Proof. For every (i,j) E C let l(i,j) be the length of a shortest collapsing 
path from i to j. It is easy to see that each (i,j) which is put in C by the 
algorithm belongs there. We prove that if ( i , j )C C then the algorithm will 
put it into C, by induction on I(i,j). If l(i,j) = 0 (i.e., i = j )  then (i,j) is put 
in C in step (0). 
Assume now that all (i,j) ~ C for which l(i,j) < L have been put in C; let 
us prove that if l ( i , j)= L then it is put in C also. Let w be the word which 
corresponds to some shortest collapsing path for (i,j). Let o be the first letter 
of w. Eventually, in the process of collapsing w, o is cancelled with some r 
via a cancellation rule or = 2. Thus, w = aw I z'w 2. 
If w 2 = L, then for or = 2 to happen, wl must vanish first. Thus, v~ = 2. 
Now if Wl corresponds to a (p,q) path, since I (p ,q )=L- -2 ,  by the 
inductive hypothesis (p, q) has been put in C and in Q. When it leaves Q, the 
pair (i,j) is discovered via step (4), if it has not been generated earlier. 
If w 2 4= 2 then both crw I r = 2 and w2 = 2. Let k be the state on the path 
between OWl r and w 2. Clearly both (i, k) and (k,j) are in C, and since 
l(i, k) < L and l(k,j) < L, by the inductive hypothesis both have been put in 
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C and Q. When the last of them leaves Q, either through step (2) or step (3), 
(i,j) will be generated and put in C, if it has not been put in C earlier. 
Q.E.D. 
If we apply the algorithm to the automaton of Example 2 (Fig. 2), the 
final matrix, describing C, is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 1 1 
1 I 
2 1 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Since the (0, 1) cell is empty (i.e., (0, 1) ~ C), the protocol of Example 2 is 
secure. 
In the complexity analysis which follows, we assume the RAM model, and 
that the basic word-length is sufficient to accommodate all the operators. 
Thus, the test of whether aT = 2 takes constant ime. 
THEOREM 2. The time-complexity of the algorithm for constructing the 
collapsing relation of automaton A (of s + 1 states) is O(s 3 + s ISz]). 
Proof. Note that for all states v 4= 0, the in-degree, din(V), is exactly 1, 
and the out degree, dout(v), is at most 1. For state 0, both din(0) and dout(0) 
are bounded by s + 122z]. Now consider the loop (t)-(4) of the algorithm. 
If i 4= 0, j =/= 0, then step (2) takes at most s steps, since all we have to do 
is compare the ith row of the matrix describing the current, C, with the j th  
row. A similar observation holds for step (3), using columns. For step (4) 
there is only one a and one ~ to check. Thus, in this case the loop takes time 
o(S), and since the number of such pairs in C is bounded by s z, the total 
time spent on such pairs is O(s3). 
If i = 0 but j 4= 0, then steps (2) and (3) are still O(s) time, while step (4) 
is O([Z:zl + s) since we have to check each incoming edge k~ ~ 0 against he 
j -~  l edge (assuming j 4= 1) to see if a~ = ~, and the number of incoming 
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edges (k~ ° 0) is bounded by IZzl + s. Since the number of such pairs is s, 
the total time spent on such pairs is O(s(I Szl + s)). The case of j=  0 but 
i 4 = 0 is similar. 
Finally, if both i=  0 and j=  0, steps (2) and (3) are redundant, while 
step (4) takes O(s(]L'zl + s)) time, since each incoming edge i -~0 (i4= 0) 
has to be checked against each of the dout(0 ) (~lZzl + s) outgoing edges, 
and each 0 -* j  ( j4 :0)  has to be checked against each of the din(0 )
(<~ IZzl + s) incoming edges, but there is no need to check a self-loop against 
a self-loop. Thus, the time spent in this case is also O(s(lNzt + s)). Q.E.D. 
Let us denote by n the length of the protocol P, which is measured as 
I 
n = S '  r ,2, 
i=1 
where [ai] is the length of the operator-word a;. Thus, n is the total number 
of operators used in P. Since each word ai[X, Y] generates exactly 6 loops in 
the automaton A (one for each choice of an ordered pair of users (X, Y) out 
of the set {S, R, ZI, ) the number of states o fA  is O(n), while the number of 
self-loops is I Zzl. I f  the operators (and cancellation rules) are fixed and are 
not part of the input of the security problem, then I Szl and the table of 
cancellation rules is of constant size. 
Thus, Theorem 2 implies, immediately, the following corollary: 
COROLLARY 1. For fixed vocabulary and cancellation rules, there exists 
a security checking algorithm of ping-pong protocols (of two users). Its time- 
complexity is O(n3), where n is the length of the protocol. 
In fact, one may allow the definition of the generic vocabulary and 
cancellation rules to be part of the input, and still maintain the O(n 3) bound 
on the time-complexity. One only needs to incorporate the preparation of the 
cancellation rules in form of a table into the algorithm (in time O(n2)). Thus, 
COROLLARY 2. For ping-pong protocols of two users there exists a 
security checking algorithm whose input is the generic cancellation rules and 
the protocol. Its time-complexity is O(n3), where n is the length of the input. 
EP ILOGUE 
Essentially, the problem we have solved in Section III is that of checking 
whether the intersection of a regular language and a certain context-free 
language is non-empty. Classically, if one is given a context-free language L, 
by a grammar G in CNF, and a regular language R, by a nondeterministic 
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automaton A, one constructs a new grammar G' which defines L (~ R, and 
then one can check in linear-time whether G' defines the empty language. If 
the description of G is of length m and A is of n states then G' comes out of 
size O(n3m). Thus, this leads to an o(na)-time, O(n3)-space algorithm to 
solve the security problem, while our solution is O(n3)-time, O(n2)-space. In 
fact, our algorithm can be generalized to answer the question of whether 
L ~R is empty, in O(nam)-time. O(nZm)-space. 
Another issue is that of protocols for k > 2 users. If one assumes that for 
P(U1, U2,..., Uk) the saboteur can effect every a t for k users, not necessarily 
distinct, then one saboteur is as powerful as many, and an O(n 3) security 
checking algorithm similar to the one shown in Section I I I  follows. However, 
it is natural to assume that this is not the case, since the user who is 
supposed to perform a t, observing that not all k users are distinct, will 
become suspicious and will not cooperate. 
Even and Goldreich have recently shown that there is an O(k) bound on 
the number of "useful" saboteurs. Thus, for a fixed k an O(n 3) security 
checking algorithm exists. However, if the number of users of P is part of the 
Problem's intput this observation is not useful since the straightforward 
extension of the algorithm leads to an exponential blow up. 
The problem of testing the security of protocols which are not of the ping- 
pong type remains wide open. 
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